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We study spatially differentiated competition between charities by partnering with 
two foodbanks in two neighboring cities to conduct a field experiment with 
roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the 
observability of charities’ location such that each donor faces a socially close 
‘home’ and a distant ‘away’ charity. We find that spatially differentiated 
competition is characterized by sorting, crowding-in, and an absence of spill-
overs: Donors sort themselves by distance; fundraising (through matching) for one 
charity raises checkbook giving to that charity, irrespective of distance; but 
checkbook giving to the unmatched charity is not affected. For lead donors, this 
implies that the social distance between donors and charities is of limited strategic 
important. For spatially differentiated charities, matching ‘home’ donations 
maximizes overall charitable income. Across both charities, however, the 
additional funds raised fail to cover the cost of the match, despite harnessing 
social identity for giving. 
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1. Introduction 
The so-called ‘science of philanthropy’ has been evolving rapidly over the last twenty years 
(see surveys by Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011; Andreoni and Payne, 2013). This interest 
reflects the size and importance of the charitable sector not only in the U.S., where charities 
received more than $400 billion in donations in 2018 (Giving USA, 2018), but also in 
European and Asian countries, which rank in the top 20 of givers (Charities Aid Foundation, 
2018). The ‘science of philanthropy’ has substantially enlarged the evidence base for the most 
popular fundraising methods, such as subsidizing charitable donations by matching funds (e.g. 
Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Karlan and List, 2007; Huck and Rasul, 2011; Huck et al., 2015; 
Kesternich et al., 2016) and has also brought new techniques into focus.1 
One area that has received greater attention only recently is how the market structure of the 
charitable sector itself affects the conclusions that can be drawn from the ’science of 
philanthropy‘. The present paper adds to this emerging literature by examining the effect of 
matching donations when highly substitutable charitable goods are provided in a spatially 
differentiated charitable sector. Competition with spatial differentiation is a commonly 
encountered market structure in the non-profit sector. Analogous to its counterpart in the for-
profit sector (Hurter and Lederer, 1985; Anderson and de Palma, 1988), spatial differentiated 
competition between charities implies that providers of nearly identical goods and services 
compete for donations and use their location as a distinguishing feature. Spatial differentiation 
is present, for example, in the food bank sector2, but also in animal shelters, safe houses, and 
other charitable goods (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997). More than 900 local foodbanks in 
                                                            
1 Examples are the sharing of information about productivity characteristics of the non-profit (Chhaochharia and 
Ghosh, 2008; Brown et al., 2017), information about the donation behaviour of others (Frey and Meier, 2004; 
Shang and Croson, 2009; Kessler, 2013), social pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2017), 
combining fundraising drives for complementary charitable goods (Adena and Huck, 2017), and the 
sophisticated use of fundraising techniques such as providing seed money (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; 
Bracha et al., 2011), offering small gifts to donors (Falk, 2007; Alpizar et al., 2008; Eckel et al., 2016) or 
comparing institutional and non-institutional fundraising techniques (Landry et al., 2006). See Vesterlund (2016) 
for an overview on fundraising techniques and their experimental based effects. 
2 Taking the food bank sector in the London metropolitan area as a typical example, there are multiple food 
banks – independent operators or branches within a network (e.g. Trussel Trust Foodbanks) – competing for 
donations, both in kind and in money. Most do so with names that explicitly reference their area of operation 
(such as Vauxhall, or Hackney or the NW (North-West) postcode. This is the case both for independent 
operators (such as “Sufra NW London” or “Whitechapel Mission”) and for food banks that are branches within a 
network (e.g. the Trussell Trust Foodbanks). In both cases, the location of the different charitable providers and 
the different branches is the distinguishing feature and is explicitly referenced vis-à-vis targeted donors. For 
example, gift aid forms for food banks affiliated with the Trussell Trust are specific to each location, with each 
local food bank, rather than the Trust, acting as direct recipient of the donation.  
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Germany, for instance, are organized under the joint umbrella organization of the ‘Tafel 
Deutschland e.V’ (Tafel Deutschland 2018). All cities with a population of more than 100.000 
have at least one foodbank, 3 percent have more than one. For the average foodbank, there is 
at least one other foodbank within a distance of less than 13 km. For 41 percent, the closest 
competitor is within 10 km. This may explain important phenomena in the charitable sector 
such as its strong franchise network structure. About 60% of the foodbanks are projects within 
existing charitable organizations (e.g. Diakonie, Caritas, DRK, AWO), around 40% are 
registered associations (e.V.). All of the 947 foodbanks carry their location in their name. 
These foodbanks provide near complete substitute services. This makes the foodbank sector a 
promising environment for studying what happens when charities deploy modern fundraising 
techniques in a spatially differentiated market.  
In the present paper, the fundraising device used by a charity competing for funds within a 
spatially differentiated market is the classic one-to-one (1:1) match. Among fundraising 
techniques, matching donations is one of the most intensely studied. Matching requires a lead 
donor who provides the lead gift, i.e. the funds used to match subsequent donations at a 
predetermined ratio (typically one-to-one) up to the limit of the lead gift. There are a number 
of findings in the literature about the effects of matches, with its own fundraising terminology 
(e.g. Karlan and List, 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Huck and Rasul, 2011; Kesternich et 
al., 2016). One is that matches are ’effective‘: This means that the receipts of the matched 
charity, inclusive of the match, are higher in the presence than in the absence of the match. A 
second is that while effective, partial crowding-out of donations often leads to matches being 
‘inefficient’: Checkbook giving by donors to the matched charity, exclusive of the match, is 
often, but not always, lower in the presence of the match than in its absence. In case of an 
efficient match, checkbook giving is higher in the presence of the match. A third is that 
matches are generally not ’efficacious’: Even when efficient, the increase in checkbook giving 
(crowding-in) is almost always less than the costs of employing the match.  
The richer market structure of spatial differentiation offers the opportunity to examine not 
only the crowding effect of a match, that is, its effect on the matched charity. We can also 
study its spillover effect, that is, its effect on an unmatched charity operating in the same 
market, and by extension its effects on total checkbook3 giving in our ‘market’. Examining 
crowding and spillover effects separately and jointly is of interest for a number of reasons: 
                                                            
3 On a point of terminology, we refer to ‘total’ checkbook giving as the sum of donations received by both 
charities from all donors. By ‘aggregate’ checkbook giving, we usually refer to a specific aggregation of 
donations either by charity or by donor location. 
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We conjecture, and establish early in our experiment, that in a spatially differentiated market 
with close substitutes, donors ‘sort’ spatially, i.e. they tend to give to charities spatially close 
to them. This ‘home bias’4 in donor behavior is a possible explanation for spatial 
differentiation in the charitable sector but also raises important questions for three 
stakeholders in the science of philanthropy: lead donors, charitable organizations, and the 
public economist. Lead donors, whose gift will be used for a matching scheme, will want to 
understand what is more effective in the presence of a home bias: Matching donations to 
donors’ ‘home’ charities – or perhaps matching donations to an ‘away’ charity, located further 
away from potential donors? For charitable organizations in spatially differentiated markets, it 
raises the question of whether they get greater impact from using a lead donation to match 
subsequent donations by ‘home donors’ or by ‘away donors’? Finally, both the spatially 
differentiated charity with branches in multiple locations and the public economist concerned 
with the private provision of public goods will be interested in whether the match is effective, 
efficient, and efficacious with respect to total outcomes: Does matching donations to one 
charity lead to negative or positive spillovers onto receipts by the other, unmatched charities? 
Do spillovers depend on whether it is the ‘home’ or the ‘away’ charity that is matched? And if 
so, are the spillovers sufficiently large to offset or augment the direct effect of the match? 
Our approach to answering these questions is to partner with two foodbanks operating within 
the same region to conduct a field experiment in which the two foodbanks compete for 
donations. About 350 potential donors receive a funding appeal from these foodbanks after 
having participated, for a fixed reward, in a household survey on an unrelated topic. In this 
appeal, they are asked to donate all or part of their 15 Euro compensation to either or both of 
the charities. Unknown to the survey participants, the donation decision was taken under 
randomly assigned treatment conditions. Using treatments in which the observability of 
spatial differentiation is either switched on or off, our first result demonstrates the extent of 
the ‘home bias’: As expected, when donors can infer the location of a food bank by location-
specific designators in the organization’s name, their giving sorts spatially in favor of a 
charity spatially close to themselves. 
Our main treatment then varies whether it is the socially close ‘home’ or the socially more 
distant ‘away’ charity, from the donor’s point of view, that is conducting a fundraising 
campaign through a 1:1 match. This gives rise to our second result: Under spatially 
                                                            
4 On another point of terminology, we are well aware that giving that favors local charities may simply reflect 
the donor’s preference structure. ‘Bias’, therefore, is not meant to imply irrational behavior by donors, but 
simply an empirical regularity of spatial sorting.  
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differentiated competition, the presence of a lead gift raises checkbook giving to the charity 
applying the match. This demonstrates that results from non-competitive settings (e.g. Karlan 
and List, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2014; Huck et al., 2015; Eckel and Grossman, 2017) carry over 
to richer market structures. Importantly, this result holds for fundraising campaigns conducted 
by both ‘home’ and ‘away’ charity, with the highest impact for donations to the ‘away’ 
charity. 
By design, the high substitutability between the two recipient organizations creates an 
unfavorable environment for total fundraising: Negative spillover effects should be maximal 
(Adena and Huck, 2017). Our third result is, however, that there are no significant negative 
spillovers from matching one charity to donations received by the unmatched one. We even 
find some evidence for positive spillovers: When a match is offered for donations to the 
socially close ‘home’ charity, donations to the socially more distant ‘away’ charity increase 
significantly. Jointly, the crowding-in of donations to the matched ‘home’ charity and a 
positive spillover effect on the amount given to the ‘away’ charity are the basis of result 4: 
Total donations to the ‘market’ of two charities reach the highest level when the ‘home’ 
charity is matched in a spatially differentiated charitable sector. 
Our results have important and nuanced implications for different stakeholders in the science 
of philanthropy: For a lead donor whose favored charity is spatially differentiated, the results 
imply that if she is after the narrow productivity of her lead gift (additional funds raised per 
dollar of lead donation), she is likely to achieve this objective by matching ’away’ donations. 
For a spatially differentiated charity, however, the presence of positive spillover effects 
between different branches within their network implies that matching ‘home’ donations is 
most effective in increasing their total charitable income. Yet even when the charity does so, 
this way of using the lead gift is not efficacious because the crowding-in is only partial: Total 
donations increase by less than the expenditures for the match. For the public economist, the 
results challenge inter-charity competition as a meaningful justification for the persistent 
popularity of matches in fundraising (Huck and Rasul, 2011): The absence of negative spill-
over effects in our setting is inconsistent with the argument that a charity needs matches in 
order to prevail in inter-charity competition. 
The results of the field experiment contribute to two different streams in the academic 
literature on charitable giving: One is the emerging literature in which charitable giving is 
examined in the context of richer market settings that involve inter-charity competition. The 
theoretical strand of literature builds on early work by Rose-Ackerman (1982), who examines 
6 
the claim that competition among charities leads to excessive fundraising. This has been 
refined by Aldashev and Verdier (2010) and Aldashev et al. (2014) and given more nuance by 
considering provider warm-glow (Scharf, 2014) and information asymmetries (Krasteva and 
Yildirim, 2015; Lange et al., 2017). The empirical strand features lab experiments5 and 
observational data.6 Closest to our paper are field experiments: Bekkers (2015) examines how 
an episode of matching donations to one charity affects giving to a natural disaster relief effort 
and finds no effect. Lange and Stocking (2012) look at the complementarities of giving 
money and giving time in a field experimental setting. Van Diepen et al. (2009b) analyze 
whether increasing the number of direct mailings of multiple charities effects donations. 
Donkers et al. (2017) study the impact of increased mailing of multiple charities, finding 
negative intra-charity spillovers over time but only weak short-term effects on other charities. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by conducting, to our knowledge, the first field 
experiment to disentangle intra-charity crowding and inter-charity spillovers of fundraising 
techniques in a competitive environment where charities are spatially differentiated. 
                                                            
5 In the laboratory, Harwell et al. (2015) find that a video promotion of one out of several charities does not raise 
total donations, but leads to a greater share allocated to the promoted charity. Brown et al. (2017) vary the 
information on quality ratings and location in a menu of ten charities and find that subjects preferentially donate 
to charities revealed as higher-quality, but not preferentially to local charities. Filiz-Ozbay and Uler (2019) 
introduce differentiated tax rebates in a multi-charity setting and find both an increase in total donations and a 
greater share of donations going to subsidized charities. In a setting where subjects have to allocate a budget 
between competing charities offering a variety of services, Deck and Murphy (2019) find a negative spillover 
from matching donations to one charity on the amounts received by unmatched charities. There is a related 
literature on the private provision of multiple public goods in laboratory settings. Corrazini et al. (2015) 
exogenously vary the number of threshold public goods. They find that aggregate donations fall in the number of 
public goods to be provided and that thresholds are less likely to be met. Krieg and Samek (2017) vary the price 
of giving in a two-public-goods setting and find that decreasing the price of providing one good increases 
aggregate donations and donations to the other good.  
6 Among the observational studies, Van Diepen et al. (2009a) show, in the short-run, negative intra-charity 
crowding from own fundraising drives, but positive inter-charity spillovers. On the other hand, a cross-sectional 
and time-series study using data of competing charities deploying matches on a crowd-funding platform finds 
neither positive nor negative spillovers (Meer, 2017). A related literature studies not only inter-charity spillover 
and intra-charity crowding effects from a spatial perspective, but also from an intertemporal perspective. Meier 
(2007) examines the effect of an episode of matching donations on later donations to the same charity. Castillo et 
al. (2017) conduct a natural field experiment to understand intertemporal inter-charity spillovers. They find that a 
matching episode increases aggregate donations and that negative spillovers wear off after one month. Cairns 
and Slonim (2011) study sequential church donations and find negative spillovers between the second and the 
first donation to the same charity. Scharf et al. (2017) investigate the effect of a fundraising appeal on donations 
received by the same charities and by different charities both immediately after the appeal and in a 20 week 
period after the appeal across a rich charity space. Immediately after the appeal, they find positive spillovers to 
other charities. This immediate increase is, however, offset by a decrease in donations in the weeks after the 
appeal. All in all, they find little evidence that non-fundraising charities are affected by negative spillover across 
time. Adena and Huck (2019) analyze whether beliefs about future fundraising campaigns effect intertemporal 
crowding, finding that donations for the same charity are intertemporal substitutes.  
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The other literature to which we contribute studies the importance of ‘social distance’ for 
fundraising outcomes. ‘Social distance’ speaks to the affinity between a potential donor’s 
identity and the recipient organization. Through the lens of social identity theory (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2002), a potential donor might be more inclined to give to a charity which she 
perceives as part of her own local community – even when she does not individually benefit 
from the charitable cause itself. In a field experiment, Kessler and Milkman (2016), for 
example, prime potential donors towards a shared local identity with the non-profit and find 
this increases donations to the charity. A lab experiment by Brown et al. (2017) provides 
information to subjects that some charities out of a menu of ten are located spatially close to 
the donor but does not find evidence that local charities are preferred. Our paper not only 
clearly identifies the presence of a ‘home bias’ of donors via exogenous treatment variations 
but also highlights that differences in social distance between donors and recipients have 
implications for the effects of common fundraising techniques in a competitive environment.7 
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, we introduce a theoretical framework that 
incorporates the concept of social distance into the study of charitable donations under 
competition. In Section 3 we describe the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 
presents the core results, starting with demonstrating the presence of a ‘home bias’ and then 
examining its implications. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results. 
2. Theoretical considerations 
To introduce the concept of social distance into the study of charitable donations under spatial 
competition, we extend a common model of impure altruism (Andreoni, 1990) to a situation 
in which both potential donors and potential recipient organizations can be characterized, 
among other dimensions, by their location in (physical) space. This section serves as a 
departure point for thinking about spatial dimensions of inter-charity competition. It 
demonstrates that sorting can be expexted for a general set of assumptions regarding donors’ 
preferences. Predictions regarding crowding and spillover effects hinge on specific 
anssumptions regarding such preferences that will not be made in this section. 
                                                            
7 An example for a trade-off between identity considerations and efficiency has been described in Akerlof and 
Kranton (2002) in the context of alumni giving. Graduates are most likely to give to their own alma mater even if 
giving to another (potentially worse endowed) educational institution would yield a higher marginal return. Of 
course, alumni giving is not solely motivated by improving educational outcomes, but might also reflect a sense 
of giving back to a community. 
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The simplest case is bi-locational: Each of two positions in space, A and B, contains both a set 
of potential donors, ݅஺ ∈ ሼ1,2, … , ܰ஺ሽ and ݅஻ ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,ܰ஻ሽ,	and a charitable organization, A 
or B. Donor ݅ at location A can give to the charity also located in A, ݃஺஺௜  (a ‘home’ donation) 
or to the one located in B, ݃஺஻௜  (an ‘away’ donation). Likewise, a donor ݅ at location B can 
give to the ‘away’ charity located in A, ݃஻஺௜ , or to the ‘home’ charity located in B, ݃஻஻௜ . The 
total amount of giving to each charity, A and B, is therefore  
1 1 1 1
 and 
A B A B
A B A B
N N N N
i i i i
AA BA AB BB
i i i i
A g g B g g
   
      
 
Under impure altruism, the utility of a donor at location A can be represented by a function 
that contains consumption ݔ௜, the provision of the two public goods ܩ஺ሺܣ, ܤሻ, and the warm 
glow of giving ݃௜൫݃஺஺௜ , ݃஺஻௜ ൯ as arguments. In the bi-locational case and under the assumption 
that location is the only relevant difference between individuals, this means that for a donor at 
location A, utility is given by  
    , , , ,i i ii i A AA ABU x G A B g g g  
and for a donor at location B, utility is given by 
    , , , ,i i ii i B BA BBU x G A B g g g , 
which individuals maximize subject to the budget constraint given income ݕ. We explicitly 
allow for different prices of giving: Individuals at location B face a price of giving to the 
charity at A, ݌஻஺, and a price of giving to the charity at B, ݌஻஻. In the absence of any 
fundraising activities by either charity, these prices both equal 1. Fundraising through a match 
by one charity affects the respective price of giving to this charity. For instance, by offering a 
match, charity A can lower its price of giving such that now her donors from B face ݌஻஺ ൏ 1 
and likewise her donors from A face ݌஺஺ ൏ 1. We can therefore define the budget constraint 
for donors such that for a donor at - for example - location B, this is 
0i ii BA BA BB BBy x p g p g     
To capture social distance, we can extend the workhorse model of impure altruism, 
augmented with explicit prices of giving as above, in at least two ways. In both, we capture 
that individuals do not derive the same utility from providing otherwise identical public goods 
at locations A and B. One way is to consider how social distance affects the altruistic part of 
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the utility function ܩ஺ሺܣ, ܤሻ. For example, under assumptions of a constant elasticity of 
substitution between identical public goods produced by a charity located at A and another 




2 2A AA AB




      
where ߪ ൌ 1/(1 – ߤ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between the public good provided at 
A and that provided at B and ߜ஺஺ ൏ ߜ஺஻ denote measures of social distance between a donor 
at A and charities at the same or the other location. For the special case of perfect 
substitutability, altruistic benefits become simply ܩ஺ሺܣ, ܤሻ ൌ ܣ ߜ஺஺ൗ ൅ ܤ ߜ஺஻ൗ  and at equal 
prices of giving,	݌஺஺ ൌ ݌஺஻, the model predicts that an individual maximizes altruistic utility 
by donating to the socially closer charity only. In other words, there is perfect donor sorting 
according to social distance. 
The other approach is to focus on the warm glow part ݃௜൫݃஺஺௜ , ݃஺஻௜ ൯ of the utility function in 
order to capture social distance. Hewing closely to the altruistic channel above, the warm 
glow component can be modelled in a similar way such that  




i i i i i
AA AB AA AB
AA AB
g g g g g
 
 
      
where ߠ ൌ 1/ሺ1 െ ߭ሻ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the warm glow of giving 
to A and that of giving to B and ߛ஺஺ ൏ ߛ஺஻ denote measures of social distance between a 
donor at A and charities at the same or the other location, respectively. For the special case of 
perfect substitutability, warm glow benefits reduce to  ,i i i i iAA AB AA AA AB ABg g g g g   . 
݃௜൫݃஺஺௜ , ݃஺஻௜ ൯ ൌ ݃஺஺
௜
ߜ஺஺൘ ൅
݃஺஻௜ ߜ஺஻൘ . As in the approach centered on the altruism component, 
spillover is perfect when prices of giving are equal: Individuals maximize their utility by 
donating to the socially closer charity only.  
Given the general set-up above, changes in the social distance and changes in the price of 
donating can have different impacts on total giving by an individual and on the relative shares 
going to the charity at the ‘home’ location and the ‘away’ location. This has implications for 
the ability of the impure altruism model to generate tight theoretical predictions. As the limit 
case of perfect substitutability illustrates, the model generally predicts sorting when social 
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distance matters: Donors in a spatially differentiated market for charitable giving will favor 
the socially close ‘home’ location, independent from whether social distance affects the warm 
glow component or the altruistic component of the donors’ utility function, or both. 
Predictions beyond sorting are considerably more involved. For example, whether donations 
to the ‘home’ charity or the ‘away’ charity increase in absolute terms after a price change 
depends, as Scharf et al. (2017) show, in subtle ways on at least four factors: The respective 
shares going to both charities at the time of the change, the price elasticity of warm glow 
and/or altruism, and the elasticity of substitution between altruism and warm glow, and the 
elasticities of substitution of altruism and warm glow between the ‘home’ and the ‘away’ 
charity. Theory provides little guidance on the magnitude of these parameters. This, and the 
complex interaction between the factors, frustrates attempts to make tight theoretical 
predictions on the effects of exogenous variations in the price of giving on total giving, 
crowding effects within charities, and spillover effects across charities. The same holds for the 
effect of changes in social distance, beyond that of sorting.  
To make headway in a situation where we cannot advance on the basis of theorizing alone, we 
set up an experimental design that instead provides empirical measurements of the important 
linkages between social distance and charitable giving. On this basis, we then examine 
whether relative differences in social distance affect the pattern of giving and how these 
patterns interact with the price of giving. 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
Our experimental design features treatment variations motivated by the theoretical 
considerations above and implemented in a field setting of donation appeals. In this setting, 
we test for the presence of crowding and spillover effects when charities compete for 
donations in a spatially differentiated sector. As a stepping stone to establishing these 
relationships, we first aim at identifying the extent of donor sorting i.e. the presence of a 
‘home bias’. We embed our experiment in an online fundraising drive of two foodbanks 
simultaneously asking for donations from the same donor.8 To clearly identify the presence 
and scope of a possible ‘home bias’, the two foodbanks we partner with for our experiment 
                                                            
8 This allows us to exploit the advantages of a framed field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) such as 
observing decision behavior in a specific but natural environment while maintaining a high level of control and 
providing detailed information about all relevant outcome variables. We use an anonymous online setting to 
avoid confounding factors such as social image concerns which have shown to play a role in fundraising 
campaigns that operate via door-to-door collections (DellaVigna et al., 2012). 
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fulfill a number of desirable criteria: They operate in the same metropolitan region, offer 
highly substitutable services, and belong to the same umbrella organization, yet are run by 
different charitable providers. The potential donors targeted in the fundraising appeals live in 
the same region the charities operate in. This metropolitan region consists of two large 
German cities, Heidelberg and Mannheim (A and B, from now on) that are located within 25 
km of each other. One of the charities is located in A and the other in B. Their exact location 
within the region does not appear in their officially registered names 9 but is highly visible in 
their public displays (Tafel Heidelberg e.V. and Tafel Mannheim e.V.).  
Before the actual experiment, participants received a fixed reward of €15 for completing a 
household survey that was thematically unrelated to the experiment. Participants accessed the 
survey via an online link and a personal participation code provided in the recruiting email in 
the appendix. This code could only be used once, thus ensuring that there was no possibility 
for multiple participations or treatment spillover. After logging in, participants were informed 
about the duration of the survey and the payment. Only after completing the unrelated 
household survey, subjects were, for the first time, confronted with the possibility to donate 
their remuneration earned in the survey. They could choose whether to donate all or a share of 
their effort remuneration (€15) to one or both of two charities mentioned in the fundraising 
drive. Unknown to the potential donors, subjects were at this stage randomly allocated to one 
of five treatment conditions (between-subjects). These five conditions resulted from varying 
two treatment dimensions (see table 1). One dimension varied the relative price of giving 
between the charities through the presence or absence of 1:1 matches for donations to one 
charity. The other dimension varied whether the charities’ location, and hence the social 
distance to the potential donor, was disclosed in the name. This variation allows to study the 
same charities in two competition settings, once with and once without spatial differentiation, 
and to detect, as a preliminary step, the presence of a potential ‘home bias’ in giving.  
At equal relative prices between the two charities (no match), the treatments T1 and T2 
manipulate social distance. In T1: Neutral, charities are referred to by their official names 
which do not disclose their location. In the T2: CityLabel condition, charities are referred to 
by their publicly displayed names, which contain a locational designator.10 Both T1: Neutral 
and T2: CityLabel, therefore, feature competition between the same two charities with an  
                                                            
9 They are registered as ‘Caritas Food Bank Shop’ and ‘Foodbank of the German Red Cross’.  
10 In both conditions potential donors are informed that both charities provide foodbank services within the 
region but only in the CityLabel conditions charities’ exact locations are observable. 
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Table 1: Summary of experimental design 
No. Match Label Treatment Observations 
T1 No Neutral T1: Neutral 76 
T2 No City label T2: CityLabel 73 
T3 Yes Neutral T3: NeutralMatch 53 
T4 Yes (home) City label T4: HomeMatch 78 
T5 Yes (away) City label T5: AwayMatch 67 
TOTAL    347 
Note: Description of treatment conditions T1 to T5 and the corresponding number of observations available for 
analysis. 
 
equal price of giving. But only T2: CityLabel features spatially differentiated competition: 
Donors, themselves located in A or B, are asked to donate to a ‘home’ (A to A or B to B) and 
an ‘away’ (A to B or B to A) charity.  
Treatment conditions (T3 – T5) vary the relative prices of giving through either one of the 
two competing charities offering to match donations as a fundraising tool. The tool is always 
a 1:1 match, i.e. each donation made will be doubled before the charity receives it.11 
Condition T3: NeutralMatch examines the baseline case of undifferentiated competition. As 
in treatment T1: Neutral, the charities lack spatial designators and can only compete on the 
price of giving. In conditions T4: HomeMatch and T5: AwayMatch, competition is spatially 
differentiated: Charities are referred to by spatial designators as in treatment T2. In T4: 
HomeMatch, donations to the donor’s socially close ‘home’ charity are matched. In T5: 
AwayMatch, the offer is to match donations to a donor’s socially more distant ‘away’ charity. 
Table 1 shows the five between-subjects treatment conditions and displays their name used in 




11 As common in the literature on matching (Karlan and List, 2007; Huck and Rasul, 2011), the match was 
casually introduced: The donation screen simply informed participants that – thanks to a campaign – one euro 
would be added to each euro donated to the matched charity. A match of 1:1 is the most common matching rate 
in the literature, possibly reflecting the observation that higher matching rates are typically not more effective 
(Karlan and List, 2007; Kesternich et al. 2016). 
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A total of 347 individuals from Heidelberg (168) and Mannheim (179) took part in the 
experiment to the end.12 On average participants completed the household survey and the 
subsequent experiment in approximately 13 minutes. After the experiment participants 
received the parts of their remuneration not donated in form of a voucher (Edenred payment 
card) which is redeemable for purchases at most major retail chains, petrol stations, and 
online shops.13 Amounts donated were passed on the respective charities including matches. 
The initial survey collected information on core demographics, i.e., age, sex, income, and 
education. We provide summary statistics of these demographics in Table A1 of the appendix. 
In our sample of potential donors, there is a slight majority of males (58.5%) and the average 
age is 40 years. The age of our sample matches that in the population of the respective cities 
and there are slightly fewer females in our sample than in the population. The income in our 
sample is higher than the population average and we oversample individuals with high 
education levels. Importantly, as shown in table A2 of the appendix, our treatment 
randomization resulted in balanced conditions with respect to these observable outcomes.  
4. Results 
As a preliminary step towards our main target - the crowding and spillover effects of 
matching donations in spatially differentiated competition - we first validate a core prediction 
of our theoretical considerations in section 2. This prediction was that charities that provide 
substantially substitutable services in a spatially differentiated market face spatially sorted 
donors. In other words, we expect donors to give preferentially to the charity located 
relatively closer to them when this is observable through a spatial designator. By the same 
logic, potential donors are predicted to be less inclined to give to charities they identify with 
less. 
We test for spatial sorting at three levels of aggregation. First, we simply compare T1: 
Neutral, in which charities’ names do not reveal their location, and hence their social distance 
to the potential donor, with T2:CityLabel, in which they do. We first pool data across charity 
and donor location – thus ignoring any location-specific effects – and ask if giving to the  
 
                                                            
12 There are further participants (55) who did not complete the study or did not clearly identify as inhabitants of 
the respective cities and thus had to be dropped from the final analysis. 
13 The participants were already familiar with this kind of payment procedures from a previous study and were 
reminded of procedures in detail in the recruiting email. This procedure has the large advantage that payments 
can be made without personal contact and without exchanging bank details.  
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Figure 1: Sorting effect 
 
Note: Average checkbook donations to a donor’s ‘home’ and ‘away’ charity under a spatially undifferentiated 
market structure T1 (left) and a spatially differentiated market structure T2 (right). Confidence intervals at the 
95%-level. 
 
‘home’ charity (from A to A or B to B) differs from giving to the ‘away’ charity (from A to B 
or B to A) in T1:Neutral and T2:CityLabel (see figure 1). In T1:Neutral, donors give 
approximately the same amount on average to the charity in their ‘home’ location (2.45) as 
they give to the charity in their ‘away’ location (1.99); i.e. there is no statistically significant 
sorting (Sign-Rank Test; p=0.74). In T2:CityLabel, however, there is a significant (Sign-Rank 
Test; p<0.001) preference for giving higher amounts to the ‘home’ charity (4.17) than to the 
‘away’ charity (0.53). A closer investigation of the entire distribution of giving (see Section 
A1.1 of the appendix) reemphasizes these patterns of giving. Furthermore, this analysis 
reveals that the observed sorting effects occur mainly at the extensive margin: while the 
propensity to give zero to the home charity decreases by 10 percentage points, in 
T2:CityLabel, the propensity to give zero to the away charity increases by 15 percentage 
points. This provides strong evidence for the presence of a ‘home bias’ in giving. 
In a second step, we disaggregate this analysis further to account for the possibility that there 
could be location specific effects through unobserved charity or donor characteristics. Such 
effects would be expected to imply systematic differences in whether and how much subjects 
donate to charity A or B. Table 2 shows, at different levels of aggregation, the average flow of 
donations from donors to charities for a spatially undifferentiated charity sector and a 

















































Table 2: Average donations by donor and charity type 
  Donor Location  
  A B 
Average amount 
received (from 
donor location A 










n A 2.08; 4.31 (T1)   (T2) 
2.31; 0.14 
(T1)   (T2) 
2.19; 2.25 
(T1)   (T2) 
B 1.69; 0.93 (T1)   (T2) 
2.85; 4.03 
(T1)   (T2) 
2.26; 2.48 
(T1)   (T2) 
Average amount given 
(i.e. to A and B) by 
donor 
1.88; 2.61 
(T1)   (T2) 
2.58; 2.08 
(T1)   (T2) 
2.22; 2.35 
(T1)   (T2) 
Note: Cells report average donation in € per subject in each treatment. Left-hand entries in each cell indicate 
checkbook giving when charity locations are not observable (T1); right-hand entries indicate checkbook giving 
when charity locations are observable. The average checkbook donations to a donor’s ‘home’ charity seen in 
figure 1 are the treatment-wise average along the core cells diagonal (AA, BB); the average checkbook donations 
to a donor’s ‘away’ charity are the treatment-wise averages on the diagonal (BA, AB).  
 
First, the cell in the southeast corner of the table reports the grand average amounts given by 
the average donor to the average charity, which by construction corresponds to the average 
amount received by the average charity. These flows are statistically indistinguishable 
between T1: Neutral (2.22) and T2: CityLabel (2.35) (M.W. Rank Sum; p= 0.76). Repeating 
this kind of analysis by charity (far-right column), we similarly see that each charity (i.e. 
averaging donations from donor location A and B), receives the same amount of donations, 
irrespective of the market structure (Charity A – T1: Neutral: 2.19  vs. T2: CityLabel: 2.25, 
p=0.76, M.W. Rank Sum; Charity B – T1: Neutral: 2.26 vs. T2: CityLabel: 2.48, p=  0.98, 
M.W. Rank Sum). Third, looking at the average by donor location (bottom row), subjects’ 
average giving to both charities does not differ in a statistically significant way between the 
two market structures (Donor A – T1: Neutral: 1.88 vs. T2: CityLabel: 2.61, p=0.35, M.W. 
Rank Sum; Donor B – T1: 2.58 vs. 2.08, 0.60, M.W. Rank Sum). Taken together, the 
disaggregated analysis provides no evidence that the headline sorting effect shown in figure 1 
can be explained by strong donor specific (i.e. differences between donors in A and B) or 
strong charity specific (i.e. differences between charities A and B) heterogeneities in giving. 
At the third and most disaggregated level (central four cells), the evidence also aligns with the 
sorting prediction. Comparing donation streams under T1: Neutral (first column entries) and 
T2: CityLabel (second column entries), we find significant differences. In T1: Neutral, donors 
located at city A or city B give similar amounts to charities A and B (Donor A – 2.08 vs. 1.69, 
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p=0.65, Sign-Rank Test; Donor B – 2.31 vs. 2.85, p=0.93, Sign-Rank Test). This pattern 
changes markedly in T2: CityLabel. Donations to subjects’ socially close ‘home’ charity are 
now significantly higher than to their socially more distant ‘away’ charity for both charity and 
donor types: donations from persons located in A flow preferentially to charity A rather than 
to charity B (4.31 vs. 0.93, p=0.001, Sign-Rank Test) and likewise for donations from donors 
located in B, who give preferentially to charity B (0.14 vs. 4.03, p<0.001, Sign-Rank Test). 
Thus, after accounting for location-specific idiosyncrasies, we continue to find consistent 
evidence for a ‘home bias’. We summarize these observations in our first Result.14 
 
Result 1 
In a spatially differentiated market for charitable giving, overall giving and charity receipts 
were the same as in a spatially undifferentiated one. However, donors sorted spatially in the 
sense that they preferentially gave to charities in the socially close ‘home’ location and not 
preferentially to charities in the socially more distant ‘away’ location.  
The demonstration that spatial differentiation in a charitable sector causes no change in 
overall giving, but causes donor sorting not only sheds light on the particular donor 
environment in which the main treatment intervenes. It also provides two additional insights. 
One is that this significant shift in underlying donor behavior can be induced by a rather 
subtle change in the fundraising environment that moves the same charity from a spatially 
undifferentiated market into a differentiated market by disclosing their locations. Small 
changes in the market structure may, therefore, lead to big changes in patterns of giving 
among the potential donor population, and therefore in the context in which fundraising tools 
are studied. This also implies that charities need to carefully think about the spatial 
distribution of their donor population before they decide to partake in spatially differentiated 
competition. The second insight is that when fundraising methods are studied, the conclusions 
can differ significantly, depending on the specific donor-charity flow under investigation. 
Comparing local donations, i.e. where donor and charity are in the same location, in the 
undifferentiated and the differentiated setting, we see that differentiation raises local 
donations considerably. This mirrors the results of a recent paper (Kessler and Milkman, 
2016) that finds that charities can attract additional local donations by emphasizing close 
                                                            
14 We find equivalent results when focussing at extensive margin giving i.e. the decision to give. In T1: Neutral 
donors are as likely to give a positive amount to charity A as to charity B (Sign-Rank Test; Location A: p=1, 
Location B: p=1). In T2: CityLabel there is, however, strong sorting towards the ‘home’ charity (Sign-Rank 
Test; Location A: p<0.01, Location B: p<0.001). 
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social distance. However, once either ‘away’ contributors to the local charity or ‘away’ 
donations from the local donors are taken into account, local differentiation has no impact on 
total donations received by the sector as a whole. Spatial differentiation, donor sorting, and 
the joint effects of crowding and spillovers in such a setting, therefore, merit further 
investigation through the main treatment.  
4.2. Crowding and spillover effects of matches in a spatially differentiated charitable 
sector 
Against the background of spatially sorted donors, we now turn to the core interest of this 
paper. This is to assess the full impacts of one charity deploying the classic fundraising tool of 
a match for donations in such a market setting. We first study the presence and magnitude of 
crowding effects, i.e. the effect of the match on the matched charity. Following these intra-
charity effects, we continue with the spillover effects, i.e. the presence and magnitude of 
inter-charity effects of the match on the unmatched charity. Finally, we look at the sector-
wide effects, i.e. the effects of the match by one charity on total checkbook giving.  
4.2.1.  Intra-charity effects: crowding  
Starting with the intra-charity effects of a match, the main results are summarized in figure 2. 
This figure shows the grand total effect of a 1:1 match for the average donation flowing to the 
charity applying the match. This ignores any location-specific effects and simply compares 
donation flows from ‘home’ donors to ‘home’ charities in the absence (T2: Neutral) and 
presence (T4: HomeMatch) of a match (left panel). Likewise, the right panel illustrates the 
effects of a match on donations flows from ‘away’ donors to ‘away’ charities. 
Both comparisons deliver consistent evidence for (partial) crowding-in or, conversely, strong 
evidence against crowding-out. For ‘home’ charities, the presence of a match increases 
checkbook giving from 4.17 to 6.17 (p=0.017, M.W. Rank Sum Test). For the ‘away’ 
charities we observe complete crowding-in: when a match is applied to the ‘away’ charity, 
checkbook giving increases from 0.53 to 3.27 (p<0.001, M.W. Rank Sum Test). 
These results continue to hold if we control for a set of donor characteristics and city-fixed 
effects as shown in table A3 of the appendix. Comparing the strength of the crowding effects 
for a ‘home’ and an ‘away’ match by comparing the coefficients in table 3, we do not find a 
significant difference in the overall strength of the crowding effect (2.00 vs. 2.73, p=0.529, 
comparing the size of coefficients in column (1) and (3)). For the different margins of giving 
(column (2) vs. column (4)), we find no significant differences at the extensive margin (0.59  
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Figure 2: Crowding effects on the matched charity 
 
Note: Average checkbook donations to the matched charity in the absence (left bar) or presence of a match (right 
bar). The left panel shows this comparison for a match applied to the ‘home’ charity (T2 vs T4) and the right 
panel shows the same comparison for a match applied to the ‘away’ charity (T2 vs T5). Confidence intervals at 
the 95%-level. 
 
vs. 0.97, p=0.185) but significant differences at the intensive margin (-1.13 vs. 4.70, 
p<0.001). 
Table 3 summarizes the results of a set of regression models that provide further evidence for 
the presence of (partial) crowding-in. Models 1 and 3 show the results of a simple OLS 
regression in which the amount given is regressed on a treatment dummy indicating the 
presence of a match in T4 or T5 respectively. For both the ‘home’ charities (model 1) and 
‘away’ charities (model 3) the match significantly increases checkbook giving by 2.00 and 
2.73, respectively. Models 2 and 4 follow Huck and Rasul (2011) in using a two-step 
estimation procedure of a hurdle model to estimate treatment effects on participants’ 
propensity to donate and the amount donated conditional on a positive donation being made.  
The first stage accounts for the fact that the decision to donate (i.e. the extensive margin 
choice) may react differently to the presence of a match than the decision of how much to 
donate (i.e. the intensive margin choice). This conditional choice is derived in the second 
stage of the hurdle model. At the extensive margin, we find for both ‘home’ and ‘away’ 





















































Table 3: Regression results crowding effect 
 
to give increases from 37 percent to 60 percent for the ‘home’ charity and from 10 percent to 
38 percent for the ‘away’ charity. At the intensive margin, by contrast, results differ between 
a match applied to the ‘home’ charity and a match applied to the ‘away’ charity. For the 
‘home’ charity, we do not find that conditional giving increases if a match is applied. For the 
‘away’ charity, donors give significantly more conditional on giving a positive amount. These 
differences imply that the full crowding-in observed for the ‘away’ charity is driven both by a 
significant increase in the number of donors and a significant increase in the average gift size 
by each donor while for the ‘home’ charity, the full crowding effect is driven by the extensive 
margin only. 
Adding more nuance to the grand total, we also report the disaggregated effects for the 
matched charity across charities and by donor location in table 4. The left entry in each cell 
reports the average checkbook donations in the spatially differentiated sector in the absence of 
a match. This is the baseline for the comparison and the same as reported in table 1, T2: 
CityLabel. The right-hand entry in each cell now reports average checkbook donations in the 
spatially differentiated sector, when donations to that charity are matched 1:1. Comparing the 
left-hand and the right-hand entry gives the intra-charity effect of a match at the cell-specific 
level of aggregation. 
 













































Obs. 151 151 151  139 139 139 
Notes: Models (1) and (3) OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses; models (2) and 
(4) coefficients of a hurdle model. *݌ ൏ 0.1, **݌ ൏ 0.05 and ***݌ ൏ 0.01.  
20 
Table 4: Crowding effects of a match for spatially differentiated competition 
  Donor Location  










A 4.31; 5.57 
(T2)   (T4) 
0.13; 4.72 
(T2)   (T5) 
 
2.25; 5.19 




(T2)   (T5) 
 
4.03; 6.90 
(T2)   (T4) 
 
2.47; 4.41 
(T2)   (T4/T5) 
Note: Cells report average donation in € per subject in each treatment. Left-hand entries in each cell indicate 
unmatched checkbook giving; right-hand entries indicate checkbook giving when donations to that charity were 
matched 1:1. For central cells, boldface indicates a match of donations to the ‘home’ charity (T4), italics a match 
of donations to the ‘away’ charity (T5).  
 
The central message of figure 2 that no crowding-out is present is robust to a more 
disaggregated perspective. First, disaggregating the average donation data by location, i.e. by 
charity, as reported in the rightmost column, we find that a match to charity A increases 
giving from €2.25 to €5.19 (M.W. Rank sum test, p<0.001) and a match to B, from €2.47 to 
€4.41 (p=0.024). Second, further disaggregation points towards some location specific 
idiosyncrasies in the strength, but not in the direction of the crowding effect. For charity A, 
we find that its ‘home’ donors (located at A) who increase average giving from €4.31 to €5.57 
(p=0.224, M.W. Rank Sum Test). Its ‘away’ donors (located at B), however, who increase 
giving from €0.13 to €4.72 (p< .001, M.W. Rank sum test,). For charity B, its ‘home’ donors 
(located at B) who give €4.03 without and €6.90 with a match (p=0.034, M.W. Rank sum 
test,). Its ‘away’ donors (located at A) who also increase average giving from €0.93 without to 
€1.77 with a match, however, the effect does not reach the conventional levels of significance 
and is substantially smaller than for charity A (p=0.543, M.W. Rank Sum Test). We sum up 
these observations in the following result15 
Result 2 
In a setting of competition with spatial differentiation, a match-based fundraising instrument 
crowds-in giving to the matched charity i.e. there are higher average donations to the charity 
                                                            
15 The gist of result 2 is also borne out when focusing on the cumulative distribution function (see Figure A1.1) 
and particularly on the effects on giving at the extensive margin. Overall, this suggests that the match operates 
both at the intensive and extensive margin but also that the size of these effects differs depending on the kind of 
match (‘home’ or ‘away’) as well as location and charity specific idiosyncrasies. The ‘away’ match increases 
giving at both margins while the ‘home’ match mainly operates at the extensive margin.  
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applying the match. Relative to the baseline, crowding-in tends to be larger for the socially 
distant charity. 
4.2.2. Inter-charity effects: spillovers 
Do the match-based fundraising activities of one charity cannibalize giving to the other 
charity that also competes for donations? In other words, are there negative spillover effects 
of one charity’s match to another, spatially differentiated charity that provides the same 
charitable good? This question is of particular interest for the public economist trying to 
understand the sector-wide implications of different fundraising strategies or for a spatially 
differentiated charity with multiple branches across several locations. 
The spillover effects, i.e. the inter-charity effects of a match, can be derived from the 
experimental evidence reported in figure 3. As in the previous section, figure 3 displays the 
grand total spillover effect from applying a match to the competing charity, ignoring any 
location or charity specific effects. The left panel hence displays how the presence of a match 
for the ‘away’ charity (T5: AwayMatch) impacts giving to the (unmatched) ‘home’ charity 
compared to a situation without applying any matches for either charity (T2: CityLabel). 
Giving to the (unmatched) ‘home’ charity decreases insignificantly from 4.17 to 3.04 (-27 
percent; p=0.56, M.W. Rank Sum Test). This is consistent with no spillover effects as well as 
weak negative spillover effects. For the ‘away’ charity, on the other hand, checkbook giving 
increases when the competing ‘home’ charity applies a match (T4: HomeMatch) compared to 
T2: CityLabel without a match. This positive spillover effect significantly increases 
checkbook giving from 0.53 to 1.32 (149 percent, p=0.037, M.W. Rank Sum Test). In sum, 
we find no evidence for negative spillover effects. To the contrary, we even find evidence that 
a match applied to subjects’ socially close ‘home’ charity leads to additional donations 
flowing to the socially more distant ‘away’ charity i.e. a positive spillover effect. 16 
The results of a set of regression models, which we summarize in table 5, provide further 
evidence for the absence of a clear negative spillover effect. We follow the same estimation 
strategy as for table 3, now taking giving to the unmatched charity as the depended variable. 
Models 1 and 3 thus show results for the size and direction of the average spillover effect on 
giving to the unmatched charity. Offering a match on donations to the ‘away’ charity does 
reduce giving to the ‘home’ charity non-significantly by 1.13 (model 1). A match on  
                                                            
16 This result is even more surprising when considering that participants have a fixed budget for donations. This 
fixed budget should enhance negative spillover effects while limiting positive spillover effects.  
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Figure 3: Spillover effects on the unmatched charity 
Note: Average checkbook donations to the unmatched charity in the absence (left bar) or presence of a match 
offered by the competing charity (right bar). The left panel shows this comparison for a match offered by the 
competing ‘away’ charity (T2 vs. T5) on giving to the ‘home’ charity and the right panel shows the same 
comparison for giving to the unmatched ‘away’ charity when a match is offered by the competing ‘home’ charity 
(T2 vs. T4). Confidence intervals at the 95%-level. 
 
donations to the ‘home’ charity, however, significantly increases donations to the unmatched 
socially more distant ‘away’ charity by 0.79 (model 3). Investigating the results of a hurdle 
model again reveals subtle differences for the two possible margins of giving (models 2 and 
4). 
Conditional on giving at all, donations to the unmatched ‘home’ charity are significantly 
lower when the ‘away’ charity offers a match (i.e. a significant reduction and the intensive 
margin), while the propensity to give is unaffected (i.e. no extensive margin effect). For the 
unmatched ‘away’ charity this pattern reverses. Here, the overall positive spillover effect 
results from a significant increase in extensive margin giving, while giving at the intensive 
margin also increases but only by an insignificant amount. That is the unmatched charity 
benefits from the match of another charity mainly through (passively) attracting new donors.  
This grand total effect carries through all further ways of disaggregating the data produced by 
our experiment summarized in table 6. As in table 4, the left entry in each cell reports the 
average checkbook donations in the spatially differentiated sector in the absence of a match 
(T2: CityLabel). In contrast to table 4, right-hand entries now report average checkbook 
















































Table 5: Regression analysis spillover effects 








































Obs. 140 140 140  150 150 150 
Notes: Models (1) and (3) OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses; models (2) 
and (4) coefficients of a hurdle model. *݌ ൏ 0.1, **݌ ൏ 0.05 and ***݌ ൏ 0.01. 
 
and T5: AwayMatch). The absence of negative spillovers is robust to disaggregation by 
charity, reported in the rightmost column. Introducing a 1:1 match for charity B leaves overall 
checkbook giving to charity A roughly unchanged at €2.25 compared to €2.31 (M.W. Rank 
Sum Test; p=0.53). The same is true for charity B (€2.47 compared to €1.95, M.W. Rank Sum 
Test; p=0.85).  
Spatial sorting by donors raises the question whether the absence of spillovers at more 
aggregated levels hides important heterogeneities at the spatially most disaggregated level. 
The question is answered by the core cells of table 6. There, we find that when charity B 
introduces a match, donations to charity A from its ‘home’ donors (located at A) do indeed 
decrease from an average of 4.31 to 3.29, but not in a statistically significant way (p=0.496, 
M.W. Rank Sum Test). Its ‘away’ donors (located at B), however, significantly increase 
giving to charity A from 0.13 to 1.39 (p=0.011, M.W. Rank Sum Test). Charity B’s ‘home’ 
donors (located at B) give 4.03 when charity A is not and 2.81 when it is matched, a 
statistically insignificant decrease (p=0.880, M.W. Rank Sum Test). Its ‘away’ donors 
(located at A) donate 0.93 without and 1.27 with a match applied to charity A, a statistically 
insignificant increase (p=0.575, M.W. Rank Sum Test). The disaggregated level of analysis, 
therefore, adds nuance to the picture at more aggregated levels: While there is only weak 
evidence for a negative spillover on donations from socially close donors when the socially 
more distant charity is matched (T5:AwayMatch), there is stronger evidence for positive  
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Table 6: Spillover effects of a match in the competing location 
 
spillovers on donations from socially distant donors when the socially close charity is 
matched (‘home’ match).17 
Result 3 
In a setting of competition with spatial differentiation, there is no compelling evidence that a 
match-based fundraising instrument used by one charity results in negative spillovers on 
giving to the unmatched charity.  
 
4.2.3. Sector-wide charitable giving 
Section 4.2.1 has already concluded that in the absence of matches to donations, the charities 
jointly do not raise more funding in a spatially differentiated market than in an 
undifferentiated one. Spatial differentiation simply leads to sorting among donors. We 
complement this discussion of the main results with a look at additional results at the ‘sector’ 
level. This involves comparing total giving to both spatially differentiated charities in T2: 
CityLabel with total giving in T4: HomeMatch, and with total giving in T5: AwayMatch. This 
perspective thus complements the analysis of individual crowding (see Section 4.2.1) and 
spillover effects (see Section 4.2.2) by examining the effectiveness and efficacy of match-
based fundraising by one charity for total giving to the sector as a whole. 
   
                                                            
17 The extensive margin decision whether to donate or not follows similar patterns like the average results 
reported in result 3. We summarize and discuss these results in appendix A1.1. 
  Donor Location  










n A 4.31; 3.29 (T2)   (T5) 
0.13; 1.39 
(T2)   (T4) 
2.25; 2.31 
(T2)   (T4/T5) 
B 0.93; 1.27 (T2)   (T4) 
4.03; 2.81 
(T2)   (T5) 
2.47; 1.95 
(T2)   (T4/T5) 
Note: Cells report average donation in € per subject in each treatment. Left-hand entries in each cell indicate 
unmatched checkbook giving; right-hand entries indicate checkbook giving when donations to its competing
charity were matched 1:1. For central cells, boldface indicates a match of donations to the ‘home’ charity
(treatment 4), italics a match of donations to the ‘away’ charity (treatment 5).  
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Figure 4: Total donations 
 
 
Note: Average total checkbook donations to both charities in a spatially differentiated sector in the absence (T2: 
left bar) or the presence of a home match (T4: middle bar) or an ‘away’ match (T5: right bar). Confidence 
intervals at the 95%-level. 
 
Figure 4 displays the average of total charitable donations made to both charities by each 
donor across the three main treatment conditions. As expected per result 2, the positive 
crowding-in effect on the matched charity in combination with the absence of significant 
negative spillovers on the unmatched charity (result 3) raises total donations to both charities 
above the baseline of a spatially differentiated charitable sector. However, for the unmatched 
‘away’ charity we do not only observe the absence of a negative spillover effect, but rather a 
positive spillover effect when the ‘home’ charity receives a match. In sum, this significantly 
increases total donations from 4.69 to 7.49 in case the match targets charities’ ‘home’ donors 
(p=0.007, M.W. Rank Sum Test). In case the match targets charities’ ‘away’ donors, it also 
increases total giving from 4.69 to 6.31, this increase, however, does not reach the 
conventional levels of significance (p=0.114, M.W. Rank Sum Test). These observations are 
summarized as result 4. 
Result 4:  
In a setting of competition with spatial differentiation, total charitable donations made to both 
charities are significantly higher in the presences of a ‘home’ match. Total donations are also 
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From the vantage point of a spatially differentiated charity with multiple branches, result 4 
implies that match-based fundraising targeting charities’ socially close ‘home’ donors raises 
its charitable income by the highest amount. Donors respond to such fundraising activities by 
giving more to the matched ‘home’ charity (result 2), but also by giving more to the 
unmatched ‘away’ charity (result 3). From the perspective of the public economist, none of 
the matching schemes under investigation can be called efficacious in the sense that total 
checkbook giving more than doubles through the presence of the 1:1 match. 
4.2.4. Generalizing results to a setting without spatial differentiation 
Result 2 adds to those studies that find a crowding-in effect of matching donations (e.g. 
Karlan and List, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2014; Huck et al., 2015). Yet, the disaggregated 
evidence also adds nuance by raising the possibility that in the spatially differentiated charity 
sector, crowding-in increases, in relative terms, with social distance. Result 3, on the other 
hand, shows that despite high substitutability between the competing charities, there is no 
clear evidence of negative spillovers from the matched fundraising campaign of one charity to 
the donations given to its unmatched competitor. Again, at the spatially disaggregated level, 
evidence suggests that spillovers vary by social distance: Socially distant donors responded 
positively to the ‘away’ match, thus compensating for some negative spillovers affecting 
donations from socially close donors. The potential role of social distance in crowding and 
spillover effects raises the question whether result 3 is specific to a competitive setting of 
spatial differentiation, in which donors’ ‘home bias’ can play out, or whether it generalizes to 
settings without spatial differentiation, such as in T1: Neutral. To answer this question, we 
conducted a control treatment (T3: NeutralMatch). This shares with treatment T1:Neutral a 
setting without spatial differentiation, but differs from it by featuring one charity (A or B) for 
which donations are matched 1:1 while those for its competitor are not.  
As a corollary to result 2, we examine crowding first. Comparing T1:Neutral and T3: 
NeutralMatch, the evidence for crowding-in is weak for charity A (€2.19 vs. €3.88, p=0.093, 
M.W. Rank sum test) and even weaker for charity B (€2.25 vs. €3.38, p=0.262, M.W. Rank 
Sum Test). The effects are weak at all levels of aggregation, including when further 
disaggregating by donor location (p>0.25 for all four possible comparisons, M.W. Rank Sum 
Test). As in result 2, statistically significant evidence for crowding-out is absent, but so is the 
clear evidence for crowding-in that was observed in a spatially differentiated market. 
In contrast to result 3, a comparison of T1: Neutral and T3: NeutralMatch finds no strong 
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evidence for either negative or positive spillover effects from match-based fundraising of one 
charity to unmatched donations to its competitor. This holds true for each charity (charity A, 
€2.19 vs. €2.67, p=0.69; charity B, €2.25 vs. €1.74, p=0.71, M.W. Rank Sum Test) and when 
further disaggregating by donor location (p>0.2 for all four possible comparisons, M.W. Rank 
Sum Test).18 In a spatially undifferentiated market, we therefore do not find similar patterns 
of positive spillovers observed in a spatially differentiated market. 
Finally, in contrast to result 4, total donations in a spatially undifferentiated charity sector are 
not significantly higher when donations to one charity are matched. Comparing total giving to 
both charities in T1: Neutral with total giving in T3: NeutralMatch. In T3: NeutralMatch, 
total donations only slightly increase from 4.44 to 5.85 in the presence of a matched charity 
(p-value=0.169, M.W. Rank Sum Test).  
In sum, under spatially undifferentiated competition between charities offering the same 
charitable good, clear patterns of fundraising activities on crowding, spillovers and total 
donations are difficult to detect. Spatially differentiated competition makes patterns detectable 
because donors’ preferences for charity location can be said to affect the direction and size of 
crowding effects and spillovers effects. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Given the major advances in the ‘science of philanthropy’ that have given fundraising 
activities a new evidence base, a natural question for lead donors, charitable organizations, 
and the public economist is how the applications of these insights play out in richer market 
structures in the charitable sector. We introduce spatially differentiated competition, a 
commonly encountered market structure in the charitable sector, into the literature, and 
connect it on the theoretical side with the concept of social distance between charities and 
their donors. To make headway in the absence of tight theoretical predictions, we partner with 
two foodbanks in neighboring cities to run a field experiment that investigates the effects of 
matching in a charitable sector in which there is spatial differentiation. 
As predicted by theory, we establish as a first result that donors display ‘home bias’ that leads 
to spatial sorting. Against the background of this ‘home bias’, the match-based fundraising 
drive by one charity results, at the intra-charity level, in crowding-in effects, but fails to 
                                                            
18 There are also no spill-over effects on the propensity receive a donation, neither for charity A (0.25 vs. 0.29, p-
value 0.740, Chi2 Test) nor for charity B (0.25 vs. 0.41, p-value 0.104, Chi2 Test). 
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generate negative spillovers at the inter-charity level. Matching the donations of ‘away’ 
donors leads to particularly strong crowding-in effects while matching the donations of 
‘home’ donors leads to positive spillover effects on donations of the ‘away’ charity. On 
aggregate, a ‘home’ match is most effective in raising donation income. One result, which is 
fully in line with the existing literature, is that even when optimally configured for a spatially 
sorted donor landscape, matching still fails the efficacy test.  
Should further studies confirm these results, they have important implications for the different 
stakeholders in the ‘science of philanthropy’. For a lead donor, they suggest that his matching 
strategy does not have to be overly sensitive to the social distance between potential donors 
and his preferred charity. For a spatially differentiated charity with branches at multiple 
locations, the results suggest that matching ‘home’ donations will maximize their overall 
charitable income. To the public economist, who is interested in the provision of public 
goods, they suggest that matching in a spatially differentiated sector – just as its counterpart in 
a spatially non-differentiated sector – is not efficacious despite harnessing social identity, 
raising questions as to the popularity of matching in the fundraiser trade. In our experiment, 
competition cannot explain its popularity. 
Our theoretical considerations unequivocally predict that spatial differentiation will lead to 
spatial sorting if social distance affects either the warm-glow or altruistic component of a 
donor’s utility function. This prediction finds strong support in the observed donor behavior 
in our experiment. To further refine our deliberately general theoretical considerations, a 
future model of charitable giving could specify more precisely how social distance could enter 
the utility function and interact with other determinants of giving such as the price of giving 
and the substitutability between different charitable goods as well as between charitable goods 
and consumption. Our experiment provides at least three stylized facts that such future theory 
would need to be able to rationalize. First, we find crowding-in effects that depend, at least in 
their strength, on social distance. Second, for both crowding and spillover effects, we find 
subtle differences in extensive or intensive margin giving depending on whether the match 
applies to ‘home’ or ‘away’ donations. Third, we find positive spillovers from giving to the 
matched ‘home’ charity to the unmatched ‘away’ charity. More sophisticated experimental 
designs can narrow down the number of candidate models. For instance, a design that 
switches of different components of the utility function could provide insights into which of 
its components are affected by the presence of spatial differentiation (Crumpler and 
Grossman, 2008). We leave such possible extensions for future research.  
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7. Supplementary material 
A1 Additional Results 
A1.0 Sample characteristics and randomization 
Table A1: Sample characteristics 
 Total Heidelberg Mannheim 
    
Subjects (in #) 347 168 179 
Age (in years) 39.65 37.09 42.06 
Female (in %) 41.50 45.24 37.99 
Income (in EUR) 2745.40 2737.20 2752.94 
Education (in years) 15.20 15.58 14.85 
 
Table A2: Sample characteristics by treatment 
 No label &  no match 
Label &  
no match 
No Label & 
match 
Label &  
home match 
Label &  
‘away’ match 
Subjects (in #) 76 73 53 78 67 
Age (in years) 37.02 40.14 39.85 40.64 40.81 
Female (in %) 40.79 39.73 45.28 38.46 44.78 
Income (in EUR) 2961.81 2728.57 2500* 2606.67 2866.94 













A1.1 Cumulative distribution of donations 
Spatially undifferentiated market structure – Figure A1 shows the cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) for giving to the home and the away charity under a spatially 
undifferentiated market structure. Under this market structure, 33 percent of the participants 
give either to their ‘home’ or their ‘away’ charity. The extensive margin of giving can be 
inferred from the intercept of the CDFs depicted separately for the home (solid turquoise line) 
and the away (dashed green line) charity: 74 percent do not give to the home charity, and 
almost the same share (76 percent) does not give to the away charity. Each charity, thus, 
receives donations from approximately 25 percent of the participants. For these positive 
donations, the two CDFs trace out the respective intensive margins of giving. As for the 
extensive margin, the two CDFs overlap almost perfectly. For instance, the proportion of 
participants contributing less than or equal to €7 to the home or the away charity amounts to 
80 and 83 percent, respectively. The graphical representation reemphasizes our observation 
stated in the main text: The patterns of giving to the home and the away charity are 
statistically indistinguishable under a spatially undifferentiated market structure. 
Figure A1: Cumulative distribution functions of donations under a spatially 
undifferentiated market structure 
 
Note: The CDFs plot the probability that participants donate less than or equal to a certain amount. The dashed 
green line shows the CDF for the away charity, the turquoise solid line shows the CDF for the home charity. The 
share of non-giving subjects (extensive margin) is depicted by the intercept (i.e. zero donations), the intensive 
margin between donations of 1 and 15. 

























































Sorting, crowding, and spillover effects – Figure A2 plots the patterns of giving, thereby 
highlighting the average sorting (Panel A), crowding (Panel B), and spillover effects (Panel 
C) we report in the main text of the paper. These effects can be recognized by the (vertical) 
distance between the CDFs in the respective treatment conditions (T2, T4, and T5) and the 
CDFs in the corresponding baseline conditions (T1 and T2). Extensive margin effects are 
depicted in the resulting graphs as follows: A positive extensive margin effect of the treatment 
results in a negative intercept (i.e. less non-donors compared to the corresponding baseline 
condition). A negative extensive margin effect of the treatment results in a positive intercept 
(i.e. more non-donors compared to the corresponding baseline condition). Further inspecting 
the shape of the effect plots sheds more light at changes in donation patterns at the intensive 
margin. Here, a positive treatment effect is visually represented by a curve in the negative 
domain (a higher frequency of donations) and a negative treatment effect by a curve in the 
positive domain (a lower frequency of donations).  
In Panel A of Figure A2, the negative intercept for the home charity (dashed brown line) 
indicates that spatial differentiation increases donations at the extensive margin (sorting 
effect). The frequency of zero donations to the home charity decreases by 10 percentage 
points. At the intensive margin, the flat curve for home donations indicates that most of this 
change occurs for high donation levels. The frequency of €15 donations, for instance, 
increases from 9 percent in T1 Neutral to 21 percent T2 City Label. For the away charity, the 
extensive margin effect is in the opposite direction (dash-dot blue line): There are fewer 
donors (such that the intercept is positive) and the frequency to donate nothing increases by 
13 percentage points from 76 percent in T1 Neutral to 89 percent in T2 City Label. The shape 
of the curve furthermore shows that the differences at the intensive margin occur as a shift 
from relative large donations to relatively small donations between treatment and control. The 
proportion of participants giving €7 or less, for instance, to the away charity in T2 City Label 
is 16 percentage points larger. 
Panel B in Figure A2 depicts the crowding effect at the extensive margin, i.e. additional 
donors that the ‘home’ charity (dashed purple line) or the ‘away’ charity (dash-dot green line) 
can attract by offering a match relative to a baseline where no match is offered. We find a 
significant increase in the propensity to give to the matched charity. The (negative) intercept 
in Panel B shows that the relative size of this effect is comparable for ‘home’ and ‘away’ 
donations. For the ‘home’ charity the propensity to receive a donation increases by 23 
percentage points (37 percent T2 City Label vs 60 percent T4 Home Match) and for the 
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‘away’ charity by 28 percentage points (10 percent in T2 City Label vs. 38 percent in T5 
Away Match).19 These results correspond to the extensive margin effects shown in models 2 
and 4 of Table 3 in the main text. The shape of the effect plots show an increase in the 
frequency of relatively low and medium donations, an effect that is especially pronounced for 
the home charity. 
Panel C in Figure A2 illustrates the size of spillover effects at the extensive margin, i.e. the 
propensity to give to the unmatched charity when the competing charity offers a match. The 
solid brown line depicts differences in donation patterns between the baseline (T2 Neutral) 
and the treatment, where the ‘home’ charity faces a competing ‘away’ charity offering a 
match (T5 Away Match). The dashed gray line depicts the corresponding pattern for the 
‘away’ charity. For the ‘home’ charity, there is no evidence for a negative spillover effect at 
the extensive margin; the intercept is virtually zero and thus the propensity to give to the non-
matched home charity is statistically indistinguishable between T2 Neutral and T5 Away 
Match. When the home charity is matched, for the non-matched ‘away’ charity, the 
propensity of receiving zero donations (dashed grey line) decreases by 12 percentage points 
from 89% in T2 Neutral to 78% in T5 Away Match. In other words, the number of ‘away’ 
donors almost doubles when the competing ‘home’ charity offers a match (T4), compared to a 
situation without matching.20 Investigating the shape of both curves further reaffirms 
regression results discussed in 4.2.2. For the home charity there are negative spillover effects 
at the intensive margin as illustrated by the increasing shape of the effect plot, especially the 
frequency of higher donations is decreasing. For the away charity there are only small and 
marginally positive changes at the intensive margin, resulting in a higher frequency of small 
donation amounts, while there is a larger extensive margin effect.  
Figure A2 graphically reemphasizes the two central econometric results. We find consistent 
evidence for positive crowding effects at the extensive margin that are in line with previous 
                                                            
19  Disaggregating further to the charity level, we continue to find that the presence of a match significantly 
increases the propensity to receive a donation for both charity A (Chi2 Test, p<0.001) and charity B (Chi2 Test, 
p<0.037) independent from the donor location. On the lowest level of aggregation, results are slightly more 
nuanced. For charity A, applying a match increases the propensity to receive a donation from donors located in 
A insignificantly (Chi2 Test, p=0.116) and from donors located in B significantly (Chi2 Test, p<0.001). Results 
for charity B are similar in direction, but not in size. Here, a match insignificantly increases the flow of 
donations from A donors (Chi2 Test, p=0.811) and significantly from B donors (Chi2, p=0.013). 
20 Disaggregating this analysis by charity type, we neither find evidence for negative spillover effects for charity 
A (Chi2, p= 0.408) nor for charity B (Chi2, p= 0.727). At the lowest level of aggregation, we account for both 
charity and donor location. Mirroring our intensive margin results, for charity A we find no negative spillovers 
on the propensity to receive donations from A donors (Chi2, p=0.53) and positive spillovers on the propensity to 
receive donations from B donors (Chi2, p= 0.01). Likewise, for charity B, there is neither evidence for negative 
spillovers on the propensity to receive donations for A donors (Chi2, p= 0.82) nor such evidence for B donors 
(Chi2, p= 0.66).  
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findings in the literature (Karlan and List 2007). Through matching donations, charities  
Figure A2 Treatment effects on the cumulative distribution of donations 
 
Note: Between-treatment differences in the CDFs for giving to the home and the away charity, separately for 
sorting (Panel A), crowding (Panel B), and spillover effects (Panel C). Graphs show the treatment effects on the 
probability to participants donate less or equal to a certain amount. Negative intercept effects represent positive 
extensive margin effects. 
increase the size of their donor base. Spillover effects at the extensive margin are either absent 
(home charity) or positive (away charity). At the intensive margin, treatment effects are more 
nuanced and depend on the type of effect under investigation. Sorting effects occur at both the 
extensive, and to a lower degree at the intensive margin. We find evidence for crowding-in at 
the intensive margin that is present for the home charity (dashed purple line) and more 
pronounced for the away charity (dash-dot green line). Spillover, effects operate at the 
extensive margin for the away charity and at the intensive margin for the home charity. 
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A1.2 Additional Regression Results: Crowding Effects 






















































































EFFECT YES YES YES  YES YES YES 











Obs. 145 145 145  131 131 131 
Notes: Models (1) and (3) OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses; models (2) and 
(4) coefficients of a hurdle model. *݌ ൏ 0.1, **݌ ൏ 0.05 and ***݌ ൏ 0.01. 
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A1.3 Additional Regression Results: Spillover Effects 







































































































Obs. 132 132 132  144 144 144 
Notes: Models (1) and (3) OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses; models (2) and (4) 
coefficients of a hurdle model. *݌ ൏ 0.1, **݌ ൏ 0.05 and ***݌ ൏ 0.01.  
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A2: Design, Instructions and Procedures 



























Invitation email (translated from German 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
In June 2015, you were invited to a scientific study by Heidelberg University and the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. Back then you stated your interest in other studies and asked us to 
contact you via email if a new study was to be carried out. 
This year the Ruprecht-Karls-University of Heidelberg, the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in 
Mannheim and Bayreuth University are also carrying out a scientific study. It includes a survey on the topics 
“speed limit in cities“ and “citizen participation in political decision-making”. The research project is funded by 
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
You can support our research project by participating in a 15-minute online survey. If you complete the entire 
questionnaire, you will receive a remuneration for your participation of 15 euros about 4 weeks after the 
survey. You will receive your payment in the form of an Edenred voucher as last time. This payment method 
enables us to transfer your remuneration to you without you having to state your account information. You can 
redeem your voucher in several local and online shops (e.g. Galeria Kaufhof, Karstadt, Media Markt, Saturn). 
No special previous knowledge is necessary. Please note that only one person per household is allowed to 
participate in the study and that this person needs to be of age. 
You can immediately start with the survey. To do so, please click on the following link and register on the first 
screen of the survey website by using your personal access key: 
www.zew.de/umfrage2017 
Your personal access key (valid until 20.03.2017) is:  <<CODE>> 
We are happy to answer your questions. Please call us at 0621/1235-369 or write to us at umfrage@zew.de.  
We are looking forward to your participation in this survey, which will surely also be interesting for you. Thank 
you very much for supporting our research project.  
 
Prof. Timo Goeschl, Ph.D. 
Research Centre for Environmental Economics  
Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics 
Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg 
 
Dr. Martin Kesternich 
Deputy Head 
Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management 
Centre for European Economic Research 
 
Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schüßler 
Faculty of Cultural Studies 
Professor - Ethics  
Bayreuth University 
 




Instructions, questionnaire, and experiment (translated from the German original) 
- Screen 1 - 
Welcome to this study! 
Dear participant, 
Thank you for your interest! In a few moments, the survey will start. Firstly, please find some central 
information regarding this study: 
 Taking part in this study takes about 15 minutes on average 
 The study consists of one questionnaire which will be shown on several screens consecutively 
 After completing the questionnaire, you will receive EUR 15. 
 
Please note: Please use the provided buttons to navigate through the different screens. Please do not 
use the buttons of your browser as it might cause inaccurate results or cancel the study.  
Please click “next” to learn more about your remuneration. 
- Screen 2 - 
Information on content and proceedings of this study  
Who are the directors of this study?  
This study represents a collaboration between the University of Heidelberg, the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim and the University of Bayreuth. The University of 
Heidelberg is a public institution for education and research of the German federal state of Baden-
Württemberg. The ZEW is a non-profit research centre and member of the Leibnitz Association. The 
University of Bayreuth is a public institution for education and research of the German federal state of 
Bavaria. Our research projects are funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.  
What happens with my data?  
We use your data exclusively for scientific purposes and evaluate them in an anonymous form. Your 
personal details will exclusively be used to transfer your remuneration. We will neither associate them 
with your specifications made in this study nor disclose them to a third party.  
How does the amount of remuneration come about?  
You will receive EUR 15 upon completing the questionnaire.  
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- Screen 3 - 
The questionnaire starts on the next screen. Please carefully read through all the questions. 
- Questionnaire screen 4 to screen 16 -  
The questionnaire is unrelated to the experiment. The questionnaire items can be supplied upon 
request. 
- Screen 17 - 
The University of Heidelberg, the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, and 
the University of Bayreuth would like to thank you for participating in this study which has been 
funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Please click “next” in order to conclude 
this questionnaire. 
- Screen 18 - 
Treatments 
- Screen 19 - 
For your participation in this scientific study, you will receive EUR 15. By default, we will send you 
your remuneration by mail in the form of an Edenred shopping voucher. On the suggestion of 
participants of former studies, we will offer you the option to donate your remuneration (fully or 
partly) to our partner charities.  
____________________ 
[T1 Neutral, NoMatch:] 
the Caritas Food Bank Shop and the (mobile) foodbank of the German Red Cross. Both options are 
charitable organizations which offer quality food products which are no longer used in the economic 
process in the Rhine-Neckar Region to those in need.  
[T2 CityLabel, NoMatch: ] 
the Tafel Mannheim e.V. and the Tafel Heidelberg e.V. Both options are charitable organizations 
which offer quality food products which are no longer used in the economic process in Mannheim or 
Heidelberg to those in need. For more information on these organizations, click here: Tafel 
Mannheim, Tafel Heidelberg. 
[T3 Neutral, Match:] 
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the Caritas Food Bank Shop and the (mobile) foodbank of the German Red Cross. Both options are 
charitable organizations which offer quality food products which are no longer used in the economic 
process in the Rhine-Neckar Region to those in need.  
At the moment, there is a campaign which enables us to multiply your donation made to the (mobile) 
foodbank of the German Red Cross. To each euro donated to the (mobile) foodbank of the German 
Red Cross, there will be one extra euro added. So every euro the (mobile) foodbank of the German 
Red Cross receives will eventually result in two euros.  
[T4 CityLabel, HomeMatch or T5 CityLabel, AwayMatch:]  
the Tafel Mannheim e.V. and the Tafel Heidelberg e.V. Both options are charitable organizations 
which offer quality food products which are no longer used in the economic process in Mannheim or 
Heidelberg to those in need. For more information on these organizations, click here: Tafel 
Mannheim, Tafel Heidelberg. 
At the moment, there is a campaign which enables us to multiply your donation made to [Tafel 
Mannheim] [Tafel Heidelberg]. To each euro donated to [Tafel Mannheim] [Tafel Heidelberg], there 
will be one extra euro added. So every euro [Tafel Mannheim] [Tafel Heidelberg] receives will 
eventually result in two euros. 
____________________ 
If you want to make use of this opportunity, please specify below the share of your remuneration 
(EUR 15) you would like to donate respectively. Please note that the values entered will be rounded up 
one digit after the decimal point.  
If you chose not to make use of this opportunity, please confirm the following: 
Button: Thank you, I do not want to donate. 
- Screen 20 (Overview of donations) - 
Please check your information listed below. 
[NO DONATION]  
Your personal remuneration:  
You receive EUR 15 in the form of an Edenred shopping voucher.  
[MAXIMUM DONATION]  
You have donated your whole remuneration.  
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Overview of donations:  
Your donation to [Charitable organization 1]: EUR [xx] 
Your donation to [Charitable organization 2]: EUR [xx] 
[PARTIAL DONATION]  
Overview of donations: 
Your donation to [Charitable organization 1]: EUR [xx] 
Your donation to [Charitable organization 2]: EUR [xx] 
[T3, T4, T5] Due to the campaign, [Charitable organization x] additionally receives: 
You receive EUR [xx] in the form of an Edenred shopping voucher 
If you agree with this, please choose „conclude study“. You will then see the final screen. If you want 
to modify any specification, please choose „edit“. You will reach a screen on which you can modify 
your initial specifications.  
- Correction – 
Screen 19 and Screen 20 are repeated if subject chooses “edit”. 
- Screen 21 - 
If you have already taken part in a former study, you have received an Edenred shopping voucher. We 
can recharge your voucher card with the remuneration of today. To do so, we solely need your voucher 
card number which can be found on the front side of your voucher card. If your card is not at hand, we 
can send you a new one by mail. For this, please enter your address again. If you do have your 
voucher, please enter your voucher card number so that we can recharge it with EUR [xx]. 
If you do not have hold of your Edenred voucher or if this is your first time taking part in this kind of 
study, please enter your address for us to send you a new voucher card. Note: We will use your 
address solely for sending the voucher and will not disclose it to a third party. Furthermore, your 
address will not be linked to your specifications made in this questionnaire. If you have any further 
questions regarding this procedure, you can refer to the study directors by phone (+49 621/1235-369) 
or by email (umfrage@zew.de).  
- Screen 22 - 
Thank you! Your information has been saved. 
ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische  
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European  
Economic Research
L 7,1 · 68161 Mannheim · Germany 
Phone  +49 621 1235-01  
info@zew.de · zew.de
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW 
research promptly avail able to other economists in order 
to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. 
The authors are solely respons ible for the contents which 
do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW. 
IMPRINT
//
Download ZEW Discussion Papers from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/
or see:
https://www.ssrn.com/link/ZEW-Ctr-Euro-Econ-Research.html 
https://ideas.repec.org/s/zbw/zewdip.html
